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Abstract	
Hart	and	Moore	(2008)	argue	that	varying	degrees	of	flexibility	in	contracts	induce	
differing	reference	points	and	aspiration	levels	for	parties’	shares	of	a	transaction’s	total	
surplus.	As	a	consequence,	a	trade‐off	between	adaptational	 flexibility	and	the	preven‐
tion	of	distributional	 conflicts	emerges.	 In	a	 recent	paper,	Fehr	et	al.	 (2011)	analyze	a	
buyer‐seller‐relationship	with	 incomplete	 contracts	 and	 ex	 ante	uncertainty	 regarding	
the	sellers’	cost	level	to	test	these	effects.	We	re‐run	their	experiment	and	introduce	an‐
other	 treatment	with	 exogenously	 determined	 contract	 types.	 Like	 FHZ	we	 find	 refer‐
ence	point	effects	in	both	treatments.	However,	uncooperative	shading	behavior	in	our	
treatments	 differs	 substantially	 from	 that	 described	 in	 FHZ.	 Furthermore,	 it	 makes	 a	
significant	difference	whether	contract	 types	are	determined	by	buyers	or	determined	
exogenously.	We	explain	this	by	introducing	two	further	effects,	a	reciprocity	effect	and	
a	signaling	effect.	
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1  Introduction  
Hart	and	Moore	(2008)	provide	a	new	behavioral	 theory	 for	 the	emergence	of	 flexible	
vs.	rigid	contracts.	They	assume	that	contractual	performance	depends	on	whether	the	
trading	parties	are	able	to	realize	the	profits	they	believe	themselves	to	be	entitled	to.	If	
they	are	unable	to	derive	this	amount	of	profit,	 they	feel	aggrieved	and	are	 inclined	to	
punish	their	 trading	partners	by	not	delivering	consummate	performance.	 In	doing	so,	
they	generate	a	welfare	loss.	Hart	and	Moore	(2008)	argue	that	through	the	irrevocable	
fixing	of	prices	under	competitive	 terms,	buyers’	 and	 sellers’	 aspiration	 levels	become	
compatible	so	that	neither	aggrievement	of	any	trading	partner	nor	the	delivery	of	bad	
quality	 (“perfunctory	 performance”	 or	 “shading”)	 will	 occur.1	 In	 this	 way,	 concluding	
contracts	with	rigid	terms	serves	to	reduce	inefficiency.		
However,	 making	 rigid	 contracts	 has	 its	 own	 drawback.	 Irrevocable	 fixing	 of	 the	
terms	 of	 a	 contract	might	make	 it	 impossible	 to	 adapt	 to	 unforeseen	 events.	 This	 de‐
creases	welfare.	Consequently,	there	exists	a	trade‐off	between	being	able	to	effectively	
adapt	to	new	circumstances	and	the	ability	to	avoid	distributional	conflicts.	By	extend‐
ing	this	simple	logic,	Hart	and	Moore	provide	a	basis	for	long‐term	contracts	in	the	ab‐
sence	 of	 non‐contractable	 investments	 and	 an	 explanation	 of	 rigid	 employment	 con‐
tracts.		
Fehr	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 present	 a	 first	 experimental	 investigation	 of	 Hart	 and	Moore’s	
theory.	At	the	first	stage,	buyers	determine	whether	to	offer	a	rigid	or	a	flexible	contract.	
Next,	contracts	are	auctioned	off.	The	auction	design	ensures	a	competitive	equilibrium	
so	that	sellers	accept	minimal	prices	for	their	products.	In	rigid	contracts,	these	auction	
prices	are	irrevocable	and	identical	to	final	prices.	In	unfavorable	circumstances	deter‐
mined	by	a	chance	move,	these	prices	do	not	allow	the	trade	to	be	realized.	According	to	
Hart	 and	Moore	 (2008),	 rigid	 contracts	will	 ensure	 the	delivery	of	high	quality	by	 the	
sellers.	In	contrast,	flexible	contracts	always	allow	trading.	The	costs	of	flexible	contracts	
consist	of	distributional	conflicts	that	are	induced	by	incompatible	aspiration	levels,	i.e.,	
subjective	entitlement	to	shares	of	a	total	surplus,	on	the	part	of	buyers	and	sellers.	Buy‐
ers	are	allowed	to	increase	prices	above	auction	prices	to	appease	sellers	so	that	they	do	
not	provide	 low‐quality	products.	At	 the	 final	 stage,	 sellers	decide	whether	 to	provide	
normal	or	low	quality.	Note	that	a	delivery	of	low	quality	increases	the	seller’s	costs	so	
that	no	seller	has	a	material	incentive	to	make	such	a	delivery.		
By	 and	 large,	 the	 results	 of	 Fehr	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 are	 in	 line	 with	 those	 of	 Hart	 and	
Moore	(2008).	There	is	less	shading	in	rigid	contracts,	although	sellers	use	their	poten‐
tial	 for	 	 increasing	prices.	 This	definitely	 supports	 the	view	of	 rigid	 contract	prices	 as	
reference	points.	Two	robustness	checks	also	support	Hart	and	Moore	(2008):	(a)	reduc‐
                                                 
1	Hart	(2009),	Hart	and	Holmstrom	(2011),	and	Hart	(2011)	developed	a	theory	of	the	firm	that	based	on	
the	contracts	as	reference	point	approach.	
TO	CHOOSE	OR	NOT	TO	CHOOSE	–	M.	ERLEI	&	C.	REINHOLD	
‐	3	‐	
 
ing	the	range	of	price	increases	that	is	feasible	in	flexible	contracts	decreases	the	provi‐
sion	of	low	quality	(perfunctory	performance);	and	(b)	eliminating	the	competitive	de‐
termination	 of	 (auction)	 prices	 induces	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 low	
quality	(Fehr	et	al.	(2009)).		
Fehr	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 admit	 that	 two	 features	 of	 their	 experimental	 results	 are	 quite	
surprising.	First,	they	find	very	little	perfunctory	performance	with	rigid	contracts.	This	
is	 surprising	 because	 payoffs	 are	 highly	 asymmetric	 in	 these	 cases	 and	 standard	
measures	of	fairness	or	inequity	aversion	suggest	much	more	perfunctory	performance.	
Furthermore,	the	act	of	choosing	rigid	contracts	itself	can	be	interpreted	as	an	uncoop‐
erative	behavior	 that	deserves	punishment	via	 the	delivery	of	 low	quality.	Second,	 the	
unexpectedness	of	this	finding	is	increased	because	there	is	much	more	perfunctory	per‐
formance	in	 flexible	contractual	relations	even	though	the	payoff	asymmetry	 is	signifi‐
cantly	reduced	by	buyers’	voluntary	price	 increases.	Fehr	et	al.	 (2011)	conjecture	 that	
this	can	be	explained	by	a	“new	behavioral	 force”:	“ex	ante	competition	legitimizes	the	
terms	of	the	contract,	and	aggrievement	occurs	mainly	about	outcomes	within	the	con‐
tract	and	not	about	the	contract	itself.”	(Fehr	et	al.	(2011),	p.	493)	In	our	judgment,	this	
explanation	 seems	 rather	 artificial.	 Do	 sellers	 really	make	 such	 a	 neat	 distinction	 be‐
tween	“within	the	contract”	and	“the	contract	itself”	while	at	the	same	time	not	consider‐
ing	that	the	buyers’	choice	of	rigid	contracts	causes	their	profits	to	decrease	significant‐
ly?	Furthermore,	the	choice	of	contract	types	is	by	no	means	determined	under	competi‐
tive	conditions.		
This	is	where	our	analysis	begins.	Our	motivation	for	conducting	our	own	investiga‐
tion	is	based	upon	two	open	questions:	(1)	why	do	sellers	not	punish	buyers	for	choos‐
ing	 rigid	 contracts?	 and	 (2)	why	 do	 sellers	 not	 appreciate	 buyers’	 voluntary	 price	 in‐
creases	 in	 flexible	contracts?	To	 test	whether	Fehr	et	al.’s	 interpretation	of	 the	data	 is	
appropriate,	we	replicate	FHZ’s	main	treatment	and	introduce	a	new	treatment.	In	this	
new	treatment,	contract	types	are	not	determined	by	the	players.	 If	FHZ	are	right,	 this	
change	in	experimental	design	should	not	have	an	impact	on	subjects’	behavior.	If,	how‐
ever,	the	players’	behavior	changes	significantly,	there	must	be	other	forces	at	work	than	
just	reference	point	effects.		
Our	main	findings	are	as	follows:	(a)	in	the	replication	treatment	with	endogenous	
contract	types,	we	find	many	more	cases	of	delivery	of	low	quality	(perfunctory	perfor‐
mance)	than	reported	in	FHZ;	and	(b)	in	the	case	of	exogenously	determined	rigid	con‐
tracts,	 perfunctory	 performance	decreases	 substantially.	 Our	 interpretation	 of	 (a)	 and	
(b)	 is	 that	 the	 subjects	 in	 our	 experiment	 do	 indeed	 punish	 buyers	 for	 choosing	 rigid	
contracts.	We	call	this	a	reciprocity	effect.	Additionally,	(c)	there	is	significantly	less	per‐
functory	performance	if	 flexible	contracts	are	determined	exogenously	than	if	the	buy‐
ers	 actively	 choose	 flexible	 contracts.	 Our	 interpretation	 of	 this	 phenomenon	 is	 that	
players’	aspiration	levels	depend	not	only	on	contract	types	but	also	on	the	signal	that	
buyers	send	by	choosing	flexible	contracts,	which	are	more	favorable	to	sellers.	Sellers	
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then	expect	their	trading	partners	to	be	more	cooperative	so	that	sellers’	aspiration	lev‐
els	 increase	with	 respect	 to	 their	 share	 of	 the	 surplus.	 This	will,	 in	 turn,	make	 sellers	
more	inclined	to	provide	perfunctory	performance	if	buyers	turn	out	to	be	less	generous	
than	expected.	We	 call	 this	 the	 signaling	effect.	Nevertheless,	we	 find	 (d)	 evidence	 for	
the	existence	of	a	reference	point	effect	in	treatments	with	both	endogenous	and	exoge‐
nous	determination	of	contract	types.		
The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	In	Section	2,	we	describe	our	experiment’s	design	
and	provide	details	regarding	the	procedures	used.	In	Section	3,	we	present	the	behav‐
ioral	predictions.	 Section	4	 contains	our	 results	 and	 the	 relevant	discussion.	 Section	5	
concludes.		
2  Experimental Design 
In	this	section,	we	present	our	experimental	design	and	procedures.	We	consider	a	rela‐
tionship	between	a	buyer	and	a	seller	who	are	interacting	during	a	two‐period	relation‐
ship.	At	date	0,	they	conclude	an	incomplete	contract	for	the	trade	of	one	unit	of	a	widg‐
et.	The	incompleteness	of	the	contract	is	due	to	the	possibility	that	the	trade	may	not	be	
feasible	on	date	1.	The	 feasibility	depends	on	 the	nature	of	 the	contract	and	on	the	ex	
ante	unknown	state	of	nature.	The	relationship’s	dynamic	resembles	the	“fundamental	
transformation”	described	by	Williamson	(1985).	In	such	a	setting,	transaction	partners	
begin	with	a	competitive	market	structure	that	after	some	events,	e.g.,	a	specific	invest‐
ment,	 changes	 into	 a	 one‐sided	 or	 bilateral	monopoly.	 In	 all	 treatments,	we	have	 two	
different	kinds	of	contracts,	i.e.,	rigid	and	flexible	contracts,	and	this	brings	our	experi‐
ment	in	line	with	the	model	proposed	by	Hart	and	Moore	(2008).		
We	 implemented	 two	 different	 treatments,	 an	 endogenous	 contract	 treatment	
(EndCT)	and	an	exogenous	contract	 treatment	 (ExCT).	The	EndCT	 is	closely	related	 to	
the	design	of	Fehr	et	al.	(2011).	In	our	ExCT	we	abolish	the	buyers’	ability	to	choose	be‐
tween	 contract	 types.	Each	 session	 consists	of	15	 such	periods.	 Figure	2	 (given	 in	 the	
appendix)	 shows	 the	 structure	 of	 each	period.	 To	 facilitate	 subjects’	 understanding	 of	
the	experiments,	we	subdivided	each	period	into	seven	sequential	stages:	
Stage	1	–	Formation	of	groups:		
To	avoid	reputational	effects,	buyers	and	sellers	were	randomly	divided	into	inter‐
action	groups	of	two	sellers	and	two	buyers	each	at	the	beginning	of	each	period.		
Stage	2	–	Determination	of	contract	types:	
The	 determination	 of	 contract	 types	 varied	 between	 the	 two	 treatments.	 In	 the	
EndCT,	buyers	decide	whether	to	choose	the	rigid	or	the	flexible	contract	design.	In	the	
ExCT,	 the	 contract	 design	 is	 exogenously	 given	 to	 the	 participants.	 The	 difference	 be‐
tween	the	designs	relates	to	the	process	of	determining	the	final	product	price.	In	rigid	
contracts,	 the	auction	price	(Stage	3)	 is	binding	for	buyers	and	sellers.	Furthermore,	 if	
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the	state	of	nature	(Stage	4)	turns	out	to	be	bad,	these	binding	contracts	do	not	allow	for	
trade	 to	 be	 accomplished.	 In	 flexible	 contracts,	 buyers	 may	 increase	 product	 prices	
above	the	level	given	by	the	auction	if	they	wish	to	do	so,	and	trade	is	always	feasible.	
Table	1	 shows	 the	 intervals	 of	 feasible	 final	 prices	with	 respect	 to	 contract	 types	 and	
states	of	nature.		
Stage	3	–	Sellers	compete	for	contracts	in	clock	auctions:	
After	the	two	buyers	in	a	group	have	chosen	their	contract	types,	contracts	are	auc‐
tioned	off	to	the	sellers.	Just	like	FHZ,	we	implemented	an	inverse	clock	auction	with	a	
starting	price	of	35	that	is	increased	by	one	point	each	second.	The	auction	ends	either	
when	the	upper	limit	of	75	is	reached	or	if	one	of	the	sellers	accepts	the	current	auction	
price	by	 clicking	 a	button	on	 the	 computer	 screen.	The	 first	 seller	 accepting	 the	price	
gains	 the	 contract	 and	 enters	 into	 the	 bilateral	 contract	 performance	 stages.	 As	 de‐
scribed	above,	the	final	price	either	is	 fixed	at	the	level	of	the	auction	price	(rigid	con‐
tracts)	or	may	voluntarily	be	increased	by	the	buyer.	Sellers	who	do	not	gain	a	contract	
realize	an	outside	option	payment	of	10	points.		
To	design	a	truly	competitive	auction,	the	supply	of	widgets	was	made	twice	as	large	
as	the	demand.	More	precisely,	each	seller	is	able	to	produce	up	to	two	widgets	per	peri‐
od,	while	 buyers	 can	 buy	 just	 one	widget.	 This	means	 that	 any	 seller	may	 serve	 both	
buyers,	while	any	buyer	can	only	buy	from	one	seller.	Consequently,	there	is	an	excess	
supply,	which	creates	a	highly	competitive	auction	environment.	Unlike	in	FHZ,	the	auc‐
tions	 for	 the	 two	possible	 contracts	 in	 each	 group	 are	 conducted	 simultaneously.	 The	
auction	boxes	are	randomly	placed	next	 to	each	other	on	 the	computer	screen.	Sellers	
are	free	to	engage	in	any	of	the	auctions	as	long	as	none	of	them	has	accepted	an	auction	
price	 for	 the	 auction	 in	 question.	 If	 one	 of	 the	 contract	 prices	 is	 accepted,	 the	 corre‐
sponding	auction	is	immediately	finished.		
Table	1:	Intervals	of	Feasible	Final	Prices	
	 State	of	nature	
Contract	type	 Good	 Bad	
Rigid	contract	 Auction	price	 No	trade	
Flexible	contract	 [Auction	price,	140]	 [95,	140]	
Note:	 The	 auction	 price	 was	 determined	 by	 an	 inverse	 clock	 auction	 between	 the	 two	
sellers	in	one	group.	It	could	range	from	35	to	75.		
	
Stage	4	–	Determination	of	the	state	of	nature:	
After	the	sellers	and	buyers	have	concluded	their	contracts,	they	are	informed	about	
the	 state	of	nature.	This	 state	determines	 the	parameters	of	 the	 remaining	part	of	 the	
period.	First,	it	has	an	impact	on	sellers’	costs	(see	Table	2).	In	bad	states,	sellers’	costs	
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increase	by	60	points.	In	addition,	minimum	final	prices	are	also	increased	to	95.	Second,	
the	state	of	nature	determines	whether	sellers	and	buyers	can	trade	at	all.	If	buyers	have	
chosen	rigid	contracts	and	a	bad	state	emerges,	 trade	becomes	impossible.	 In	all	other	
cases,	trade	will	be	accomplished	(see	Table	1).	Good	states	occur	with	a	probability	of	
80	percent	and	bad	states	with	a	probability	of	20	percent.	In	the	no‐trade	case,	buyers	
and	sellers	get	an	outside	option	of	10	points	each.		
Table	2:	Experimental	Parameter	
State	of	nature	 Good	(prob	=	0.8)	 Bad	(prob	=	0.2)	
Quality	of	the	widget	 normal	 low	 normal	 low	
Seller’s	cost	 20	 25	 80	 85	
Buyer’s	value	 140	 100	 140	 100	
	
Stage	5	–	Determination	of	the	final	price:	
The	process	of	determining	final	prices	depends	on	the	chosen	contract	type.	In	the	case	
of	rigid	contracts,	participants	do	not	have	to	make	any	decisions	because	the	final	price	
is	given	by	the	auction	price.	With	flexible	contracts,	buyers	can	voluntarily	increase	fi‐
nal	prices	above	the	auction	price	(or	above	95	in	bad	states),	up	to	a	maximum	of	140	
(see	Table	1).		
Stage	6	–	Sellers	choose	quality:	
If	trade	takes	place,	sellers	have	to	determine	product	quality,	which	can	be	either	
low	or	normal.	Irrespective	of	the	state	of	nature,	choosing	low	quality	instead	of	normal	
increases	sellers’	costs	by	5	points	and	decreases	buyers’	value	by	40	points	(see	Table	
2).	
Stage	7	–	Determination	of	profits:	
At	 the	end	of	 each	period,	profits	are	displayed	 to	buyers	and	sellers.	The	payoffs	
were	calculated	as	follows:	
Seller	profits:	S	=	price	–	costs		
Buyer	profits:	B	=	value	–	price		
To	compare	our	results	with	those	of	FHZ,	it	is	necessary	to	summarize	the	ways	in	
which	our	EndCT	differs	 from	the	experiment	of	FHZ.	First,	we	used	different	 instruc‐
tions,	though	they	were	of	course	somewhat	similar	to	those	of	FHZ.2	As	mentioned,	we	
used	simultaneous	auctions	(Stage	3)	instead	of	sequential	auctions	because	we	wanted	
to	ascertain	which	contract	type	is	preferred	by	the	sellers.	Finally,	FHZ	provided	buyers	
                                                 
2	Instructions	are	available	upon	request.		
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with	aggregate	information	about	average	buyer	profits	as	an	additional	eighth	stage	of	
each	period.	Average	profits	were	given	 separately	 for	 the	 two	contract	 types	over	all	
past	periods.	Though	providing	this	information	facilitates	learning,	it	also	weakens	the	
independency	of	individual	decisions	and	fosters	contagion	effects.	We	felt	that	next	to	
the	speed	of	the	learning	process,	it	might	have	an	impact	on	the	direction	of	learning.		
All	 sessions	were	 conducted	 in	 December	 2008	 and	 January	 2009.	We	 conducted	
two	 sessions	 for	 each	of	 the	 two	 treatments	with	20	 subjects	 each	 (10	buyers	 and	10	
sellers).	Subjects	were	students	from	the	Clausthal	University	of	Technology	with	majors	
such	as	Business	Administration	or	Industrial	Engineering.	To	make	them	familiar	with	
our	experimental	design,	we	started	every	session	with	two	training	periods	that	were	
not	 remunerated.	 In	 both	 treatments,	 45	 experimental	 currency	 units	 (points)	 corre‐
sponded	to	one	Euro.	In	addition,	each	participant	received	a	show‐up	fee	of	5	Euro.	On	
average,	subjects	earned	18.28	EUR	(about	25.41	USD	at	the	time	of	the	experiment).	A	
session	lasted	for	about	one	and	a	half	hours.	The	experiments	were	computerized	using	
the	software	z‐Tree	(Fischbacher	2007).		
3  Hypotheses  
The	main	motivation	for	carrying	out	our	experiment	is	that	we	presume	that	the	pro‐
cess	of	determining	contract	types	has	an	impact	on	subjects’	behavior.	Different	modes	
of	 determining	 contract	 types	may	 lead	 to	 different	modes	 of	 behavior.	 In	 particular,	
sellers	 may	 be	 able	 to	 learn	 that	 rigid	 contracts	 decrease	 their	 expected	 profits	 and	
cause	an	unfair	distribution	of	profits.	Sellers	realizing	this	will	be	inclined	to	interpret	
the	choice	of	rigid	contracts	as	unfriendly	behavior	that	deserves	punishment	via	provi‐
sion	of	low	quality.	On	the	other	hand,	choosing	of	flexible	contracts	may	be	understood	
as	a	signal	of	cooperative	behavior.	Such	a	signal	will	 increase	sellers’	expectations	re‐
garding	profits.	Assuming	that	 this	will	 increase	sellers’	aspiration	 levels,	 low	price	 in‐
crements	will	not	meet	sellers’	aspiration	levels	and	provoke	shading.	In	summary,	ac‐
cording	to	our	considerations,	the	feasibility	of	actively	choosing	contract	types	increas‐
es	 the	 inclination	 to	 provide	 low	 quality.	 Consequently,	 replacing	 the	 active	 choice	 of	
contract	types	with	a	chance	move	will	lead	to	less	shading	in	both	types	of	contractual	
relationships.	Keeping	this	in	mind,	we	can	now	present	our	central	hypotheses.		
After	group	formation,	the	second	stage	in	each	period	consists	of	determining	con‐
tract	types.	In	the	EndCT,	we	expect	the	same	pattern	of	decisions	as	reported	by	Fehr	et	
al.	 (2011).	Because	 there	 is	no	 choice	between	contract	 types	 in	 the	ExCT,	 it	does	not	
make	sense	to	provide	any	behavioral	hypotheses	regarding	this	decision.		
HYPOTHESIS	1	(Contract	Choice):		 	
In	the	endogenous	contract	treatment,	subjects	choose	rigid	contracts	 in	about	50	
percent	of	cases	and	flexible	contracts	in	the	remaining	50	percent	of	cases.		
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At	Stage	2	of	each	period,	contracts	are	auctioned	off.	Since	there	is	always	an	excess	
supply,	equilibrium	prices	are	equal	to	minimum	prices.	Following	FHZ,	we	expect	to	see	
deviations	in	early	rounds	due	to	subjects’	learning.	In	contrast	to	FHZ,	we	implemented	
simultaneous	auctions	for	both	buyers’	contracts	within	one	group.	This	renders	it	pos‐
sible	to	analyze	which	kind	of	contract	sellers	prefer.	 In	FHZ,	sellers’	profits	 in	 flexible	
contracts	are	significantly	higher	than	in	rigid	contracts.	Expecting	a	similar	pattern	of	
profits,	sellers	will	prefer	flexible	contracts.	In	groups	in	which	there	is	one	auction	for	
rigid	contracts	and	one	auction	for	flexible	contracts,	sellers	will	thus	try	to	get	a	flexible	
contract	first	and	only	afterwards	try	to	get	the	remaining	rigid	contract.	Due	to	the	na‐
ture	of	the	clock	auction,	prices	for	rigid	and	flexible	contracts	will	differ	in	these	cases.		
HYPOTHESIS	2	(Auction	Prices):	
a) In	both	 treatments,	auction	prices	converge	 toward	 the	competitive	equilibri‐
um,	pA	=	35.	
b) On	 average,	 prices	 for	 flexible	 contracts	 are	 lower	 than	 prices	 for	 rigid	 con‐
tracts.	
While	rigid	contracts	 leave	no	room	for	price	adjustments,	 flexible	contracts	allow	
buyers	 to	 increase	 prices	 within	 the	 price	 range	 above	 the	 competitive	 lower	 price	
bound.	This	opportunity	may	affect	 the	sellers’	shading	decision	so	 that	 increasing	the	
price	may	 encourage	 sellers	 not	 to	 provide	 low	 quality.	 This	 price	 decision	 at	 date	 1	
(Stage	 5)	 is	 somewhat	 similar	 to	 an	 ultimatum	 game	 [Güth,	 Schmittberger,	 Schwarze	
(1982)]	in	which	a	proposer	makes	an	offer	regarding	how	to	share	an	amount	of	money	
with	the	responder.	The	responder	then	decides	whether	to	accept	the	proposal	or	re‐
ject	it.	In	this	type	of	game,	rejections	result	in	a	payoff	of	zero.	In	our	experiment,	buy‐
ers	act	as	a	kind	of	proposer	by	offering	a	particular	share	of	the	total	surplus	to	the	sell‐
er.	After	this,	the	seller	“accepts”	the	offer	by	providing	normal	quality	or	“rejects”	it	by	
providing	 low	quality.	 Unlike	 in	 the	 ultimatum	game,	 the	 seller	 can	 lower	 the	 buyer’s	
profit	by	only	40	points	in	our	experiment,	and	his	costs	increase	by	only	5	points.	In	line	
with	 Forsythe	 et	 al.	 (1994),	we	 expect	 that	 buyers	will	 pay	prices	 significantly	 higher	
than	the	lower	price	bound	to	avoid	shading.		
FHZ	show	that	buyers	are	indeed	willing	to	pay	significant	price	increments	associ‐
ated	with	 flexible	 contracts.	 Accordingly,	we	 expected	 to	 find	 a	 similar	 pattern	 in	 the	
EndCT.	However,	behavior	related	to	the	ExCT	may	differ.	Being	able	to	choose	between	
contract	types	and	choosing	flexible	contracts	may	have	an	impact	on	sellers’	aspiration	
levels	in	the	EndCT	that	is	absent	from	the	ExCT.	In	particular,	we	presume	that	a	buyer	
choosing	flexible	contracts	signals	a	preference	for	cooperative	and	fair	behavior.	Thus,	
sellers’	expectations	rise.	This	signaling	effect	does	not	exist	in	ExCT	because	sellers	do	
not	choose	their	contract	types.	Consequently,	sellers’	aspiration	 levels	remain	smaller	
so	that	buyers	need	to	pay	smaller	amounts	of	money	to	prevent	sellers	from	shading.		
HYPOTHESIS	3	(Price	Increment):	
TO	CHOOSE	OR	NOT	TO	CHOOSE	–	M.	ERLEI	&	C.	REINHOLD	
‐	9	‐	
 
a) In	 both	 treatments,	 buyers	 pay	 prices	 that	 are	 higher	 than	 the	 lower	 price	
bound	in	flexible	contracts	and	consequently	price	increments	above	zero.		
b) In	the	exogenous	treatment,	a	 lower	aspiration	 level	on	the	part	of	the	sellers	
causes	lower	price	increments	or	higher	average	quality.	
At	Stage	6	of	each	period,	the	sellers	choose	whether	to	provide	low	or	normal	quali‐
ty.	This	decision	is	at	the	core	of	the	papers	by	Hart	and	Moore	(2008)	and	FHZ.	Accord‐
ing	to	the	reference	point	hypothesis,	rigid	contracts	leaving	no	room	for	further	adapta‐
tions	 provide	 a	 reference	 point	 on	which	 both	 parties	 agree.	 Although	 profits	may	 be	
highly	asymmetric,	the	existence	of	a	reference	point	prevents	shading.	The	evidence	in	
FHZ	confirms	that	there	is	less	shading	in	rigid	contracts	than	in	flexible	contracts.		
Assuming	that	the	process	of	determining	contract	types	has	an	impact	on	subjects’	
behavior,	we	conjecture	that	other	effects	besides	the	reference	point	effect	must	be	at	
work.	We	argue	that	the	possibility	of	choosing	between	contract	types	increases	shad‐
ing	in	both	rigid	and	flexible	contracts.	It	remains	unclear,	however,	whether	this	treat‐
ment	 effect	 is	 larger	 in	 rigid	 contracts	 or	 in	 flexible	 contracts.	 If	 shading	 due	 to	 the	
choice	 of	 rigid	 contracts	 is	 smaller	 than	 shading	 due	 to	 unfulfilled	 expectations	 from	
flexible	contracts,	Fehr	et	al.’s	results	can	be	explained	without	any	mention	of	reference	
point	effects.	Comparing	shading	in	both	treatments	may	clarify	the	nature	of	subjects’	
behavior.	According	to	the	theory	of	contracts	as	reference	points,	the	magnitude	of	the	
reference	point	effects	does	not	depend	on	the	process	of	determining	the	contract	type;	
instead,	it	only	depends	on	the	contract	type	itself.	Consequently,	there	will	be	no	differ‐
ences	in	shading	between	the	treatments.	If,	in	contrast,	shading	decreases	to	zero	in	the	
ExCT,	 then	 the	 reference	 point	 hypothesis	must	 be	 rejected.	 Finally,	 if	 shading	 in	 the	
ExCT	is	smaller	than	in	the	EndCT	and	if	shading	under	flexible	contracts	is	greater	than	
under	 rigid	 contracts	 (ExCT),	 then	 all	 effects	 (reference	 point	 effects,	 punishment	 ef‐
fects/reciprocity	based	on	choosing	rigid	contracts	and	signaling	effects	based	on	choos‐
ing	flexible	contracts)	are	confirmed.	This	leads	us	to	two	alternative	hypotheses:		
HYPOTHESIS	4a	(Pure	Reference	Points):		
In	both	 treatments,	 shading	will	be	 close	 to	what	 it	was	 in	FHZ,	 i.e.,	 subjects	will	
provide	low	quality	in	about		
a. 6	percent	of	cases	(rigid	contracts)	 	
b. 25	percent	of	cases	(good	states	in	flexible	contracts)	
c. 30	percent	of	cases	(bad	states	in	flexible	contracts).		
Hypothesis	4a	is	in	perfect	accordance	with	Hart	and	Moore	(2008)	and	FHZ.	Our	al‐
ternative	hypothesis	refers	to	the	existence	of	reciprocity	and	signaling	effects:		
HYPOTHESIS	4b	(Reciprocity	and	Signaling	Effects):		
(i) In	the	endogenous	contract	treatment,	shading	will	be	close	to	what	it	was	in	
FHZ,	i.e.,	subjects	will	provide	low	quality	in	 	
a. 6	percent	of	cases	(rigid	contracts)	 	
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b. 25	percent	of	cases	(good	states	in	flexible	contracts)	
c. 30	percent	of	cases	(bad	states	in	flexible	contracts).		
(ii)	In	the	exogenous	contract	treatment,	shading	will	be	lower	than	in	the	endoge‐
nous	contract	treatment	
d. If	shading	decreases	to	zero,	there	are	no	reference	point	effects.		
e. If	shading	remains	above	zero	and	if	there	is	more	shading	in	flexible	than	in	
rigid	contracts,	there	are	reference	point	effects,	reciprocity	effects	and	signal‐
ing	effects.			
4  Results 
In	 this	 section	we	present	 and	discuss	 our	 results.	 In	 the	EndCT,	we	 find	 surprisingly	
large	 deviations	 from	 the	 results	 presented	 in	 FHZ.	 Buyers	 choose	 flexible	 contracts	
more	 often	 and	 pay	 smaller	 price	 increments.	 Sellers	 provide	 low	 quality	more	 often	
than	in	FHZ.	This	difference	in	shading	is	largest	with	respect	to	rigid	contracts.	Our	new	
treatment	with	contract	determination	by	chance	moves	shows	a	large	shift	in	behavior.	
There	is	less	shading	associated	with	both	contract	types.	This	supports	our	hypothesis	
that	 the	results	presented	 in	FHZ	are	also	driven	by	 factors	other	 than	pure	reference	
point	effects.	We	 first	present	 the	results	and	 then	provide	an	explanation.	Our	aggre‐
gate	results	are	presented	in	Table	8.			
	
Insert	Table	8	here		
	
In	FHZ	each	contract	type	is	chosen	in	50	percent	of	the	cases.	Table	8	shows	that	in	
our	 sessions	with	 endogenous	 contracts,	 buyers	 reveal	 a	 clear	 preference	 for	 flexible	
contracts;	72.3	percent	of	the	contracts	were	flexible.	Taking	into	account	that	average	
buyers’	profits	in	rigid	contracts	(65.69)	are	(insignificantly)	larger	than	in	flexible	con‐
tracts	(61.2),	this	result	becomes	even	more	remarkable.	The	more	or	less	equal	distri‐
bution	of	contract	types	in	the	ExCT	is	irrelevant	here	because	contracts	have	not	been	
chosen	by	buyers	but	have	rather	been	determined	exogenously.		
RESULT	1	(Contract	Choice):		
Although	average	buyers’	profits	in	flexible	contracts	are	smaller	than	their	profits	
in	rigid	contracts	they	choose	flexible	contracts	in	more	than	two	out	of	three	cases.		
Obviously,	subjects’	behavior	in	our	experiment	is	different	from	subjects’	behavior	
in	FHZ.	We	identify	two	possible	explanations	for	this.	(1)	We,	unlike	FHZ,	did	not	pro‐
vide	 subjects	with	any	 statistical	 information	about	 the	aggregate	profitability	of	 rigid	
and	 flexible	 contracts	 in	 the	 transactions	 of	 other	 players.	 Due	 to	 this	 lack	 of	 infor‐
mation,	subjects	may	have	been	unable	to	identify	the	more	profitable	contract	type.	(2)	
We	had	a	different	subject	pool	 than	FHZ.	FHZ	excluded	all	students	of	economics	and	
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psychology,	whereas	more	 than	75	percent	of	our	subjects	study	business	administra‐
tion	or	industrial	engineering.	Consequently,	their	education	may	have	had	an	impact	on	
their	behavior	in	the	laboratory.	It	is	somewhat	surprising,	however,	that	these	econom‐
ically	 trained	participants	 favored	the	 less	profitable	but	(with	respect	 to	 the	distribu‐
tion	of	profits)	fairer	contract	type.		
After	the	buyers	had	chosen	their	contract	types,	all	contracts	were	auctioned	off	to	
the	sellers.	The	results	of	 the	auctions	are	close	 to	 the	results	 in	FHZ	and	close	 to	our	
expectations.		
RESULT	2	(Auction	Prices):		
(a) Prices	converge	to	the	equilibrium	value	p	=	35.		
(b) Prices	for	flexible	contracts	are	lower	than	those	for	rigid	contracts.		
Figure	1	shows		box	plots	for	auction	prices	in	groups	of	periods	(1‐5,	6‐10,	11‐15).	
It	 can	easily	be	seen	that	 the	auction	prices	 in	 the	 first	periods	are	well	above	35	and	
converge	over	time	to	the	equilibrium	price.	In	the	final	five	periods,	mean	auction	pric‐
es	 in	 EndCT	 and	 ExCT	 are	 36.07	 and	 35.99,	 respectively.	 In	 contrast	 to	 FHZ,	we	 held	
simultaneous	auctions	of	both	contracts	in	each	period	and	group.	Consequently,	in	ac‐
cepting	one	contract,	subjects	lost	time	and	could	only	accept	the	second	contract	after	
the	corresponding	time	 lag.	This	and	the	normal	reaction	time	of	participants	explains	
most	of	the	divergence	of	prices	from	equilibrium	values.		
	
Figure	1:	Auction	Prices	
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The	simultaneity	of	auctions	includes	another	advantage.	Excess	supply	in	markets	
for	contracts	induces	intense	competition	between	sellers	so	that	they	will	immediately	
accept	 contracts	 in	 equilibrium.	 If	 sellers	 prefer	 one	 type	 of	 contract	 to	 the	 other,	we	
should	 find	 that	sellers	 first	 try	 to	get	 this	contract	 type	and	only	subsequently	accept	
the	other	one.	This	implies	that	prices	for	preferred	contracts	will	be	lower	than	prices	
for	the	other	contracts.		
Comparing	sellers’	profits	 shows	 that	 in	 flexible	 contracts,	 sellers’	profits	 are	 sub‐
stantially	 larger:	 sellers’	mean	 profits	 under	 flexible	 contracts	 are	 22.44	 (endogenous	
contracts)	and	24.94	(exogenous	contracts);	under	rigid	contracts,	they	earn	only	15.10	
(endogenous	contracts)	and	15.91	(exogenous	contracts).	Thus,	we	expect	auction	pric‐
es	to	be	lower	for	flexible	contracts.	Table	8	shows	that	part	(b)	of	Hypothesis	2	is	also	
supported.	In	both	treatments,	auction	prices	for	flexible	contracts	are	lower	on	average,	
and	 the	difference	 is	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	5	percent	 level	 (signed	 rank	 test	 of	
individual	means).		
RESULT	3	(Price	increment):		
(a) In	both	treatments,	the	mean	price	increments	are	above	zero.		
(b) Mean	price	increments	do	not	differ	between	treatments.	
There	 are	 two	different	ways	 to	 define	 the	price	 increment.	 First,	 the	 price	 incre‐
ment	(hereafter	p35)	consists	of	the	additional	points	above	the	minimum	feasible	price	
of	35	in	the	clock	auction.3	However,	this	definition	does	not	take	into	account	that	the	
contract	/	auction	price	serves	as	a	reference	point	in	principle.	Consequently,	we	define	
the	price	 increment	 as	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 final	 price	 (chosen	by	 the	 buyer	 at	
date	1)	and	the	auction	price	in	good	states	of	nature	or	95	in	bad	states	of	nature.	Thus,	
the	price	increment	in	rigid	contracts	is	always	zero.	As	long	as	result	2	holds,	most	of	
the	difference	between	the	two	definitions	of	the	price	increment	will	disappear	in	the	
last	periods	of	the	experiment.		
In	 our	post‐experimental	 questionnaire,	we	asked	 the	 sellers	 to	 reveal	 their	mini‐
mum	price	increments	required	for	abstaining	from	shading	under	conditions	of	a	flexi‐
ble	contract,	a	good	state	of	nature	and	an	auction	price	of	35.	On	average,	in	the	EndCT	
case,	the	sellers	claim	20.25	points.	In	the	ExCT	case,	we	observe	only	a	mean	price	in‐
crement	of	10.95	points.	 Thus,	 in	 accord	with	our	 conjectures,	 the	 removal	 of	 buyers’	
responsibility	 for	 contract	 choice	 reduces	 sellers’	 aspiration	 levels	 significantly	 (one‐
sided	rank	sum	test	p<0.01).	However,	changing	treatments	does	not	have	an	impact	on	
buyers’	willingness	to	pay.	In	the	questionnaire,	we	also	asked	how	much	buyers	were	
willing	to	pay	to	foreclose	shading	under	conditions	of	flexible	contracts,	good	states	of	
                                                 
3	FHZ	use	this	definition.	
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nature	and	auction	prices	of	35.	On	average,	buyers	were	willing	to	pay	up	to	14.35	in	
the	EndCT	and	14.25	in	the	ExCT.		
Table	3	 confirms	our	post‐experimental	observations.	 It	 shows	 the	mean	price	 in‐
crement	with	respect	to	the	two	different	treatments.	None	of	the	differences	between	
the	 treatments	 is	 statistically	 significant	 (one‐sided	rank	sum	test	with	subject	means,	
p>0.10).	The	price	increments	are,	by	and	large,	the	same.	Accordingly,	buyers’	behavior	
with	respect	to	price	increments	does	not	appear	to	depend	on	the	endogeneity	or	exog‐
eneity	of	the	contract	types.		
Table	3:	Mean	Price	Increments	in	Both	Treatments	
	 State	of	nature	
	 Bad	 Good	 Total	
Fehr	et	al.	(2011)	 3.4	 10.9	 ‐‐‐	
EndCT	 2.80	(4.154)	
10.04	
(12.789)	
7.51	
(11.135)	
ExCT	 3.87	(4.932)	
11.12	
(13.587)	
9.20	
(12.326)	
Notes:	 Standard	 deviations	 are	 in	 parentheses.	 A	 one‐sided	 rank	 sum	 test	 with	 subject	
means	shows	that	none	of	the	differences	between	the	treatments	is	statistically	significant	
(p	>	0.10).	
	
The	decision	of	whether	to	provide	normal	or	low	quality	is	at	the	core	of	our	exper‐
iment.	 Following	 Hart	 and	Moore	 (2008),	 we	 refer	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 low	 quality	 as	
“shading”.	 Our	main	 research	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 difference	 in	 shading	 behavior	
with	respect	 to	contract	 types	may	not	only	be	 interpreted	as	a	 reference	point	effect,	
but	also	as	reciprocity	and	signaling	effects.	If	behavior	in	the	ExCT	is	significantly	dif‐
ferent	 from	behavior	 in	 the	 EndCT,	 there	must	 exist	 some	 additional	 effects	 that	 FHZ	
subsume	under	reference	point	effects.		
Table	 4	 summarizes	 the	 shading	 behavior	 in	 our	 experiment.	 The	 first	 distinctive	
feature	of	our	results	is	that	we	find	much	more	shading	in	the	EndCT	than	FHZ	do.	In	
particular,	there	is	more	shading	in	rigid	contracts.		
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Table	4:	Shading	Behavior		
with	Respect	to	Treatment,	Contract	Type,	and	State	of	Nature	
	 Contracts	types	and	states	of	nature	
	 Rigid	 Flexible	
	 Bad	 Good	 Bad	 Good	
EndCT	
(FHZ)	
‐‐‐	
‐‐‐	
0.32	
(0.06)	
0.37	
(0.30)	
0.33	
(0.25)	
ExCT	 ‐‐‐	 0.15	 0.08	 0.22	
Note:	Numbers	are	relative	frequencies	of	shading.	Numbers	in	parentheses	
represent	the	corresponding	relative	frequencies	of	shading	in	FHZ.		
Even	more	 importantly,	 there	 are	only	 small	 differences	 in	 shading	between	 rigid	
and	flexible	contracts.	None	of	these	small	differences	is	statistically	significant	(signed	
rank	test	of	subject	means).	In	the	EndCT,	shading	in	rigid	contracts	and	good	states	is	
just	slightly	smaller	than	in	flexible	contracts	and	good	states.	Compared	to	the	FHZ	re‐
sults,	reference	point	effects	seem	to	be	rather	small	for	our	sessions.		
Things	 are	 somewhat	 different	 in	 the	 ExCT.	 Compared	 to	 endogenous	 contracts,	
shading	is	substantially	and	significantly	smaller	 in	all	combinations	of	states	and	con‐
tract	types	(one‐sided	rank	sum	test;	p	<	0.05).	Furthermore,	in	good	states,	there	is	less	
shading	 in	 rigid	 contracts	 than	 in	 flexible	 contracts.	Our	 results	 clearly	 contradict	Hy‐
pothesis	4a	(pure	reference	points)	and	support	Hypothesis	4b.		
RESULT	4:		
(i) In	 the	 endogenous	 contract	 treatment,	 shading	behavior	 is	not	 close	 to	what	
was	evidenced	in	FHZ.	Subjects	provide	low	quality	in	 	
a. 32	percent	of	cases	(rigid	contracts)	 	
b. 33	percent	of	cases	(good	states	in	flexible	contracts)	
c. 37	percent	of	cases	(bad	states	in	flexible	contracts).		
(ii) In	the	exogenous	contract	treatment,	shading	is	lower	than	in	the	endogenous	
contract	 treatment.	 Furthermore,	 shading	 remains	 above	 zero,	 and	 there	 is	
more	shading	in	flexible	than	in	rigid	contracts.		
It	is	remarkable	how	much	more	shading	we	find	in	rigid	contracts	when	compared	
to	 the	 results	of	FHZ.	This	might	 raise	doubts	 concerning	 the	validity	of	 the	 reference	
point	hypothesis.	However,	it	has	to	be	taken	into	account	that	prices	under	flexible	con‐
tracts	are	higher	than	those	under	rigid	contracts	so	that	there	is	less	of	an	incentive	for	
sellers	to	shade.	In	Table	5,	we	present	relative	frequencies	of	shading	for	different	price	
intervals.	To	 compare	prices	 in	different	 states,	 price	 increments	 (p35)	 are	defined	as	
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final	prices	minus	minimal	feasible	prices,	 i.e.,	prices	minus	35	in	good	states	or	prices	
minus	95	in	bad	states.	Table	5	shows	that	for	all	but	one	interval,	shading	in	rigid	con‐
tracts	 and	 good	 states	 is	 less	 than	 shading	 in	 flexible	 contracts	 and	 good	 states.	 This	
supports	the	reference‐point‐effect	hypothesis	(RPE).		
Table	5:	Shading	Under	Different	Price	Intervals	
Price	incre‐
ments	(p35)	
Endogenous	Contracts	 Exogenous	Contracts	
Rigid	 Flexible	 Rigid	 Flexible	
Bad	 Good	 Bad	 Good	 Bad	 Good	 Bad	 Good	
p35	=	0	 	 .333	 .488	 .409	 	 .091	 .125	 .333	
0	<	p35	≤	5	 	 .313	 .200	 .404	 	 .191	 .000	 .308	
5	<	p35	≤	10	 	 .385	 .100	 .412	 	 .231	 .167	 .071	
10	<	p35	≤	15	 	 .000	 .667	 .188	 	 .000	 .000	 .200	
15	<	p35	 	 .000	 	 .205	 	 .000	 	 .156	
Note:	Numbers	are	relative	frequencies	of	shading.		
Our	 results	 indicate	 that	 it	makes	 a	 difference	whether	 contracts	 are	 determined	
endogenously	or	exogenously.	Endogenously	determined	rigid	contracts	clearly	result	in	
more	 shading	 than	 exogenously	 determined	 contracts.	 When	 sellers	 had	 to	 decide	
whether	to	shade	or	not,	the	only	difference	between	the	two	treatments	was	that	buy‐
ers	had	consciously	determined	 the	contract	 type	so	 that	 they	were	responsible	 for	 it.	
Our	interpretation	of	the	increase	in	shading	is	thus	that	sellers	punished	buyers	for	se‐
lecting	the	incorrect	type	of	contract.	This,	 in	turn,	 is	nothing	more	than	negative	reci‐
procity	(RecE)	and	affects	shading	behavior	in	the	opposite	direction	of	reference	point	
effects.		
The	endogenous	choice	of	a	contract	type	increases	shading	in	flexible	contracts,	as	
well.	Because	we	regard	a	decision	in	favor	of	a	flexible	contract	as	a	signal	that	increas‐
es	the	aspiration	level	of	the	seller,	it	would	seem	that	low	price	increments	disappoint	
sellers	such	that	they	are	more	inclined	to	punish	buyers	(SigE).	Table	6	summarizes	our	
theory	about	the	three	effects.		
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Table	6:	Theoretical	Effects	
	 Rigid	Contracts	 Flexible	Contracts	
Endogenous	Contracts	 RPE:RecE:
–	
+	
RPE:	
SigE:	
+	
+	
Exogenous	Contracts	 RPE: –	 RPE:	 +	
Note:	RPE	denotes	the	reference	point	effect,	RecE	the	reciprocity	effect	and	SigE	the	signaling	
effect.	The	signs	“+”	and	“–“	indicate	that	the	corresponding	effect	increases	(+)	or	decreases	(–)	
shading.	
According	to	Table	6,	and	as	long	as	the	reciprocity	effect	is	not	too	large,	shading	is	
highest	in	the	case	of	flexible	and	endogenous	contracts	and	lowest	in	the	case	of	rigid	
and	exogenous	contracts.	The	remaining	two	cases,	rigid	endogenous	contracts	and	flex‐
ible	exogenous	contracts,	are	somewhere	in	between.	It	is	ex	ante	unclear	which	of	these	
two	cases	will	have	more	shading.	These	hypotheses	are	supported	by	the	subjects’	be‐
havior	as	shown	in	Table	5.	
To	 conduct	 a	more	 rigorous	 test,	we	 performed	 some	 econometric	 estimations	 of	
shading	behavior.	 In	our	data	set,	shading	 is	given	by	the	binomial	variable	shading.	 It	
equals	1	 in	 the	case	of	 shading	and	zero	 in	case	of	normal	quality.	Final	prices	can	be	
separated	into	auction	prices	(priceauc)	and	price	increments	(priceinc).4	Table	6	shows	
that	 the	reference	point	effect	 is	 the	same	 for	endogenous	and	exogenous	contracts.	 It	
refers	only	to	the	choice	of	contract	type.	FlexC	is	the	corresponding	variable	(1	for	flex‐
ible	 contracts	and	zero	 for	 rigid	contracts).	The	 reciprocity	effect	 applies	only	 to	 rigid	
and	endogenous	 contracts.	The	binomial	 variable	 endorigid	 covers	 this	 effect.	This	 in‐
teractive	variable	is	1	for	rigid	contracts	in	the	EndCT	and	zero	otherwise.	The	signaling	
effect	 occurs	 only	 in	 flexible	 endogenous	 contracts.	 The	 corresponding	 variable	
(endoflex)	equals	1	in	these	cases	and	zero	otherwise.	According	to	our	theoretical	con‐
siderations,	shading	increases	in	FlexC,	endorigid	and	endoflex.		
Table	7	shows	the	results	of	our	estimations.	The	dependent	variable	in	all	regres‐
sions	is	shading.	The	first	estimation	in	column	2	serves	as	our	benchmark	estimation.5	
Let	us	first	look	at	the	benchmark	model,	a	random	effects	logit	model	with	few	control	
variables.	Column	2	shows	that	the	coefficients	of	FlexC,	endorigid	and	endoflex	are	all	
significant	at	the	5‐percent	level.	Their	signs	are	all	positive.	Therefore,	our	results	cor‐
roborate	the	existence	of	all	three	effects,	i.e.,	the	reference	point	effect,	the	reciprocity	
                                                 
4	Priceinc	must	not	be	confused	with	p35	in	Table	5.		
5	The	qualitative	results	of	our	estimation	do	not	depend	on	the	method	of	estimation	and	the	inclusion	of	
further	control	variables	like	state	of	nature,	sex,	age,	and	period.	We	conducted	probit	estimations,	popu‐
lation	average	estimations,	pooled	logit	estimations	and	OLS	estimations	with	similar	results.		
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effect	 and	 the	 signaling	effect.	 Furthermore,	 the	 coefficients	of	 endorigid	 and	endoflex	
are	higher	than	the	coefficient	of	FlexC,	indicating	that	the	signaling	and	reciprocity	ef‐
fects	are	as	least	as	important	as	the	reference	point	effect.	The	coefficient	of	priceinc	is	
significantly	less	than	zero,	meaning	that	buyers	can	decrease	the	probability	of	shading	
by	increasing	the	final	price.		
Table	7:	Random	Effect	Logit	Regressions	and	Social	Preferences	
Variable	 Model	I	 Model	II	 Model	III	 Model	IV	 Model	V	 Model	VI	
FlexC	 .819	
(.031)	
.828	
(.031)	
.767	
(.039)	
.744	
(.047)	
.642	
(.067)	
.756	
(.045)	
endorigid	 1.11	
(.046)	
1.11	
(.046)	
1.113	
(.044)	
1.122	
(.044)	
1.127	
(.043)	
1.12	
(.045)	
endoflex	 1.24	
(.015)	
1.24	
(.016)	
1.232	
(.016)	
1.22	
(.017)	
1.191	
(.019)	
1.219	
(.017)	
priceinc		 ‐.0807	
(.000)	
‐.087	
(.012)	
‐.059	
(.001)	
‐.060	
(.003)	
‐.051	
(.005)	
‐.070	
(.041)	
good	state	 .630	
(.024)	
.801	
(.203)	
	
	
.330	
(.188)	 	
.600	
(.269)	
reci_unfair	 	 ‐.003	(.425)	
.0099	
(.035)	 	 	
‐.005	
(.382)	
ia_shade	 	 	 	 .899	(.064)	
1.157	
(.012)	
.911	
(.062)	
constant	 ‐2.86	
(.000)	
‐2.78	
(.000)	
‐3.052	
(.000)	
‐3.47	
(.000)	
‐3.399	
(.000)	
‐3.34	
(.000)	
N	 525	 525	 525	 525	 525	 525	
LL	 ‐249.3	 ‐249.3	 ‐249.7	 ‐248.1	 ‐248.5	 ‐248.1	
LL(0)	 ‐280	 ‐280	 ‐280.1	 ‐279	 ‐279.3	 ‐279	
R2;	R2,ps	 .110	 .110	 .109	 .111	 .110	 .111	
Notes:	dependent	variable,	shading;	p‐values	(one‐sided	test)	in	parentheses;	N,	number	of	observations;	LL,	log‐
likelihood.			
Finally,	we	find	significantly	more	shading	in	good	states.	This	may	be	explained	ac‐
cording	to	two	factors.	First,	there	is	simply	less	scope	for	price	increments	in	bad	states	
(140	– 	95)	than	in	good	states	(140	– auction	price		140	– 	35).	Consequently,	compara‐
tively	modest	price	 increments	 in	bad	 states	 look	more	generous	 than	do	 larger	price	
increments	 in	good	states.	Second,	 the	distribution	of	payoffs	 is	more	unequal	 in	good	
states	 than	 in	bad	states.	For	example,	 if	 the	buyer	chooses	a	price	 increment	of	15	 in	
bad	states,	the	two	players’	payoffs	are	identical.	In	good	states,	however,	the	same	price	
increment	induces	highly	unequal	payoffs,	i.e.,	ߨ஻ ൌ 90and	ߨௌ ൌ 30.6		
                                                 
6	Here	we	assume	the	auction	price	to	be	35,	the	equilibrium	price.		
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Thus	far,	our	results	are	economically	and	statistically	significant.	We	believe,	how‐
ever,	that	due	to	the	highly	asymmetric	payoffs	in	our	experiment,	it	is	necessary	to	test	
whether	 additional	 variables	 characterizing	 social	 preferences	 or	 fairness	 preferences	
have	an	impact	on	our	main	results.	We	measure	such	social	preferences	in	two	varia‐
bles.	The	first	one,	reci_unfair,	measures	the	difference	between	the	buyer’s	and	the	sell‐
er’s	hypothetical	profits	in	the	case	of	higher	buyer	profit,	assuming	that	the	seller	does	
not	shade.	Our	second	variable,	ia_shade,	is	a	binomial	variable	with	direct	reference	to	
the	models	of	inequality	aversion	reported	by	Fehr	and	Schmidt	(1999).	Given	the	utility	
function	of	Fehr	and	Schmidt,		
௜ܷ ൌ ߨ௜ െ ߙ௜ max൛ߨ௝ െ ߨ௜, 0ൟ െ ߚ௜max൛ߨ௜ െ ߨ௝, 0ൟ,	
and	 assuming	 that	 ߙ௜ 	ൌ 	ߚ௜ ൌ 0.5,	 we	 calculated	 whether	 shading	 is	 utility‐
maximizing	in	the	sense	of	Fehr	and	Schmidt.7	The	variable	equals	1	whenever	shading	
maximizes	utility,	and	equals	zero	otherwise.		
Table	7	also	shows	the	results	of	these	estimations.	Model	I	is	the	benchmark	model	
again.	In	Model	II	and	Model	IV,	we	simply	add	one	of	the	new	variables	for	social	pref‐
erences.	Model	VI	 includes	 both	 variables.	Model	 II	 and	Model	V	 substitute	 the	 corre‐
sponding	social	preference	variable	for	the	state	variable.		
The	 introduction	of	 the	new	variables	has	hardly	any	impact	on	the	coefficients	of	
FlexC,	endorigid	and	endoflex,	i.e.,	the	variables	at	the	core	of	our	paper.	The	magnitudes	
of	the	coefficients	remain	by	and	large	unchanged	and	statistically	significant.	Again,	the	
existence	of	reference	point	effects,	reciprocity	effects	and	signaling	effects	is	confirmed.	
Likewise,	there	is	no	substantial	effect	on	the	coefficient	of	priceinc.	In	contrast,	the	coef‐
ficient	of	the	state	variable	is	highly	sensitive	to	the	introduction	of	the	variables	for	so‐
cial	 preferences.	 The	 coefficients	 of	 all	 three	 variables,	 i.e.,	 good_state,	 reci_unfair	 and	
ia_shade,	are	statistically	significant	at	the	five	percent	level	when	they	are	included	ex‐
clusively.	When	they	are	jointly	included	with	one	other	variable	or	both,	only	ia_shade	
remains	weakly	significant	(at	the	ten	percent	level).	This	sensitivity	is	due	to	the	high	
degree	of	correlation	between	these	variables	and,	in	particular,	between	good_state	and	
reci_unfair	(ߩ ൌ .68).		
Summarizing	the	results	of	the	regression	analysis,	we	can	state	our	final	result.		
RESULT	5:		
According	to	the	results	of	panel	regressions,	we	find	that	
 there	 is	evidence	 for	 the	existence	of	 reference	point	effects,	 reciprocity	ef‐
fects	and	signaling	effects;		
 all	three	effects	are	of	a	similar	order	of	magnitude;		
                                                 
7	Because	of	the	large	payoff	asymmetries	in	our	experiment,	we	had	to	select	rather	low	values	for	ߙ	and	
ߚ.	Otherwise,	inequality‐averse	players	would	shade	in	virtually	all	cases.		
TO	CHOOSE	OR	NOT	TO	CHOOSE	–	M.	ERLEI	&	C.	REINHOLD	
‐	19	‐	
 
 the	results	are	robust	with	respect	to	the	variables	included	and	the	estima‐
tion	methods;	
 the	 variables	 referring	 to	 distributional	 fairness,	 i.e.,	 reci_unfair	 and	
ia_shade,	contribute	to	the	explanation	of	subjects’	behavior.		
	
5  Conclusion 
In	this	paper,	we	provide	a	second	experimental	test	of	Hart	and	Moore’s	(2008)	behav‐
ioral	theory	of	contracts.	Hart	and	Moore’s	main	message	is	that	rigid	contract	terms	and	
particularly	 rigid	prices	may	serve	as	 reference	points	 that	 can	prevent	ex	post	 ineffi‐
ciencies	 caused	by	 incompatible	 subjective	 entitlements.	 In	 this	paper,	we	 find	 results	
deviating	significantly	 from	those	of	 the	 first	 test	presented	by	Fehr	et	al.	 (2011).	FHZ	
provide	 remarkable	 support	 for	Hart	 and	Moore	 (2008).	 However,	 they	 admit	 to	 find	
some	other	surprising	results.	In	particular,	they	find	no	evidence	of	negative	reciprocity	
due	 to	 buyers’	 uncooperative	 choices	 regarding	 contract	 types	 and	 surprisingly	 little	
remuneration	 for	 buyers’	 voluntary	 increases	 of	 contract	 prices.	 Because	 we	 regard	
their	 explanation	 as	 rather	 unconvincing,	 after	 having	 performed	 a	 replication	 treat‐
ment,	we	introduce	a	new	treatment	in	which	buyers	can	no	longer	determine	contract	
types.	In	the	new	treatment,	contract	types	are	exogenously	determined	by	the	experi‐
menter.	 According	 to	 Fehr	 et	 al.’s	 interpretation	 of	 their	 data,	 this	 change	 in	 experi‐
mental	design	should	not	have	an	 impact	on	behavior.	We	find,	however,	that	the	new	
design	 results	 in	 a	 substantial	 change	 in	 behavior.	 Furthermore,	 subjects’	 behavior	 in	
replicating	sessions	differs	significantly	from	the	behavior	of	subjects	in	FHZ.		
First,	 we	 find	more	 shading	 than	 FHZ	with	 respect	 to	 endogenously	 chosen	 rigid	
contracts.	We	regard	this	increased	shading	as	the	(negative)	reciprocity	effect	that	FHZ	
are	surprised	not	to	find:	sellers	punish	buyers	for	choosing	rigid	contracts	and	decreas‐
ing	sellers’	payoffs.	This	effect	is	so	large	that	shading	in	our	sessions	is	approximately	
the	same	in	endogenously	rigid	and	endogenously	flexible	contracts.		
Second,	determining	contract	types	exogenously,	as	we	do	in	our	new	treatment,	re‐
sults	 in	 a	 decrease	 in	 shading	 of	 approximately	 50	 percent	 for	 both	 rigid	 and	 flexible	
contracts.	Consequently,	we	 find	that	 it	does	make	a	 large	difference	whether	contract	
types	are	chosen	by	the	players	themselves,	and	that	Fehr	et	al.’s	 interpretation	of	 the	
data	seems	to	be	incomplete.	The	decrease	in	shading	under	rigid	contracts	can	be	ex‐
plained	by	the	omission	of	the	reciprocity	effect	because	buyers	are	no	longer	responsi‐
ble	for	contract	types.	We	interpret	the	decrease	in	shading	with	flexible	contracts	as	the	
omission	of	a	signaling	effect.	This	signaling	effect,	which	works	in	the	case	of	endoge‐
nous	contracts,	stems	from	the	possible	interpretation	of	sellers	that	choosing	of	flexible	
contracts	may	 signal	more	 cooperative	behavior	 on	 the	part	 of	 buyers.	 This	 signal	 in‐
creases	sellers’	aspiration	levels.	At	any	rate,	Fehr	et	al.’s	conjecture	that	“aggrievement	
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occurs	 mainly	 about	 outcomes	 within	 the	 contract	 and	 not	 about	 the	 contract	 itself”	
(Fehr	et	al.	(2011),	p.	497)	is	not	supported	by	our	data.		
Third,	we	also	 find	evidence	 for	 the	 existence	of	 reference	point	 effects.	These	ef‐
fects	are	manifest	 in	 the	 smaller	 shading	 in	 rigid	 contracts	when	compared	 to	 flexible	
contracts,	given	final	prices	and	treatments.	Fourth,	 in	our	experiment,	reference	point	
effects	are	of	a	smaller	magnitude	than	in	FHZ.	In	particular,	they	are	smaller	than	the	
treatment	 effects.	 Fifth,	 we	 find	 evidence	 for	 the	 relevance	 of	 social	 preferences	 and	
fairness	considerations	with	respect	to	payoff	asymmetries.		
In	summary,	we	find	that	it	is	not	only	contract	types	and	their	corresponding	refer‐
ence	 point	 effects	 that	 determine	 sellers’	 shading	 behavior,	 but	 also	 the	 process	 by	
which	contract	 types	are	selected.	 In	our	experiment,	sellers	 take	 into	account	buyers’	
behavior	at	all	stages	of	 the	experimental	game,	while	Fehr	et	al.	 (2011)	 find	evidence	
only	of	the	feasible	price	range	that	remains	after	the	auction	phase	and	may	cause	ag‐
grievement	and	perfunctory	performance.		
Hart	and	Moore	(2008)	and	FHZ	emphasize	that	the	existence	of	reference	point	ef‐
fects	is	dependent	on	ex	ante	competition.	According	to	both	papers,	prices	do	not	serve	
as	 reference	points	without	ex	ante	 competition.	However,	 the	experimental	design	of	
FHZ	establishes	only	one‐sided	competition	and	gives	all	market	power	 to	 the	buyers.	
There	is	no	competition	between	buyers	at	all.	We	believe	that	this	does	not	really	cor‐
respond	 to	 the	 fundamental	 transformation	 as	 put	 forward	 by	 Williamson	 (1985).	
Therefore,	a	Double	Auction	instead	of	the	seller	auction	might	be	a	better	test	of	Hart	
and	Moore’s	theoretical	approach;	however,	this	must	be	left	for	future	research.	
Finally,	in	many	experiments,	we	find	that	environments	in	which	subjects	have	lit‐
tle	or	no	information	about	trading	partners’	payoffs	result	in	behavior	that	is	closer	to	
the	standard	economic	approach.	Because	information	about	trading	partners’	payoffs	is	
often	 highly	 incomplete	 in	 real	 life,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 whether	 the	 actual	 experi‐
mental	 results	 also	 carry	over	 to	 such	 situations.	Again,	 this	 question	must	be	 left	 for	
future	research.		
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Appendix 
	
Table	8:	Aggregate	Results	
Treatment	 Endogenous	Contracts	 Exogenous	Contracts	
Contract	Type	 Rigid	 Flexible	 Rigid	 Flexible	
Rel.	Freq.	of	Contracts	 .277	 .723	 .48	 .52	
Auction	Price	(mean)	 38.69	 37.41	 38.44	 37.03	
Final	Price	(mean)	 38.69	 47.57	/	97.8	 38.44	
48.38	/	
98.87	
Rel.	Freq.	of	low	quality	 .322	 .341	 .147	 .184	
Profit	Buyer	(mean)	 65.69	 61.2	 73.12	 70.88	
Profit	Seller	(mean)	 15.1	 22.44	 15.91	 24.94	
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Figure	2:	Structure	of	Each	Period								
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